debug-node

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to read highly sensitive credential files from the target node's mounted filesystem.
  • Evidence: Accessing $SNAP/etc/shadow to check and modify root account status.
  • Evidence: Accessing /mnt/@/root/.ssh/authorized_keys to inspect and modify SSH access.
  • Evidence: Accessing /mnt/@/var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/token to retrieve Kubernetes authentication tokens.
  • Evidence: Accessing $SNAP/etc/ssh/ssh_host_* to view private host keys.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the hcloud CLI and shell commands to manipulate cloud infrastructure and server files.
  • Evidence: Uses the official Hetzner Cloud CLI (hcloud) to manage server state via enable-rescue, reboot, and disable-rescue commands.
  • Evidence: Uses sed -i to modify system authentication files such as /etc/shadow to unlock the root account.
  • Evidence: Uses chroot to execute commands within the context of the mounted target filesystem.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes system logs which may contain untrusted data, combined with powerful administrative capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: Reads /var/log/cloud-init.log, journalctl output, and /var/log/audit/audit.log in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The agent reads raw log output without delimiters or warnings.
  • Capability inventory: Shell access, file writing (sed), and cloud infrastructure control (hcloud) documented in SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: Absent. External content is read directly into the context.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill enables the extraction of sensitive system state and credentials from the environment into the agent's context, which could lead to unauthorized data exposure.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 1, 2026, 03:44 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — debug-node