debug-node
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to read highly sensitive credential files from the target node's mounted filesystem.
- Evidence: Accessing
$SNAP/etc/shadowto check and modify root account status. - Evidence: Accessing
/mnt/@/root/.ssh/authorized_keysto inspect and modify SSH access. - Evidence: Accessing
/mnt/@/var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/tokento retrieve Kubernetes authentication tokens. - Evidence: Accessing
$SNAP/etc/ssh/ssh_host_*to view private host keys. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
hcloudCLI and shell commands to manipulate cloud infrastructure and server files. - Evidence: Uses the official Hetzner Cloud CLI (
hcloud) to manage server state viaenable-rescue,reboot, anddisable-rescuecommands. - Evidence: Uses
sed -ito modify system authentication files such as/etc/shadowto unlock the root account. - Evidence: Uses
chrootto execute commands within the context of the mounted target filesystem. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes system logs which may contain untrusted data, combined with powerful administrative capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Reads
/var/log/cloud-init.log,journalctloutput, and/var/log/audit/audit.loginSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The agent reads raw log output without delimiters or warnings.
- Capability inventory: Shell access, file writing (
sed), and cloud infrastructure control (hcloud) documented inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: Absent. External content is read directly into the context.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill enables the extraction of sensitive system state and credentials from the environment into the agent's context, which could lead to unauthorized data exposure.
Audit Metadata