upgrade-cluster
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes complex data from external sources and infrastructure environments to make operational decisions, creating a surface for injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and analyze outputs from
kubectl,terraform show -json, andhcloud server list(inSKILL.mdandreferences/immutable-node-replacement.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimitation or warnings to treat outputs from these external tools as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill grants the agent powerful capabilities, including shell execution, SSH root access, Terraform plan application, and firewall rule modification.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested infrastructure metadata is specified before it is interpolated into subsequent management commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a broad suite of system administration tools including
ssh,terraform,kubectl, andhcloud. While necessary for cluster management, these provide the agent with full control over the target infrastructure and local environment. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill requires access to highly sensitive configuration and credential files. While it explicitly forbids committing these to version control, their availability in the environment represents a risk of exposure.
- Evidence: Commands access and manipulate
kubeconfigfiles,.tfstatefiles, and SSH private keys (referenced inSKILL.mdunder 'SSH Access Sanity' and state pull sections). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs remote operations to fetch code and configuration, which is standard for the workflow but involves external dependencies.
- Evidence: Uses
git pullto update the local repository andterraform init -upgradeto download provider binaries and infrastructure modules.
Audit Metadata