felo-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npx -yto download and execute a third-party Node.js package at runtime. - Evidence:
npx -y @willh/felo-cli --json "<query>"found inSKILL.mdandreferences/workflow.md. - The
-yflag bypasses the interactive confirmation prompt, executing the remote package automatically. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: User-provided search queries are interpolated directly into shell commands.
- Evidence:
npx -y @willh/felo-cli --json "<query>"inSKILL.md. - If the
<query>input is not properly sanitized, it could lead to command injection where an attacker supplies shell metacharacters. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection via search results.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted web content is ingested through the
data.answeranddata.resourcesfields of the Felo API response, as described inreferences/api-contract.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the agent when processing search data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell execution (
npx) and network operations (https://openapi.felo.ai). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the remote content is specified before it is returned to the agent context.
Audit Metadata