agentic-sdlc-improvement
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze external development traces, command outputs, and reviewer feedback, which constitutes an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Instructions in SKILL.md and trace-analysis.md direct the agent to reconstruct runs using transcripts and feedback from external sources.
- Boundary markers: The skill mandates separating recorded events from judgments and attributable feedback, establishing clear logical boundaries.
- Capability inventory: The skill's instructions focus on analysis and evaluation, delegating specific engineering changes to other specialized skills; it does not contain direct command execution or network request instructions.
- Sanitization: trace-analysis.md includes critical defensive instructions, requiring that all log messages and feedback be treated as 'untrusted evidence' and specifically warning against following embedded instructions to disable checks or copy credentials.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill explicitly restricts the agent's authority, stating that a workflow improvement cannot grant itself wider access, waive required gates, or authorize publication. It also requires preserving existing safety grants and hard limits across runs.
Audit Metadata