docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Runtime compilation of system components. The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyembeds C source code which it writes to disk and compiles usinggccinto a shared library. This process involves executing compiler commands at runtime.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Process injection via shared library. The shared object compiled by the skill is loaded into the LibreOffice process using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to intercept and wrap system calls related to network sockets.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Dynamic macro generation and execution. The scriptscripts/accept_changes.pyprogrammatically creates a LibreOffice macro and installs it into a temporary application profile to automate document editing tasks.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Ingestion of untrusted data surface.\n - Ingestion points: Extracted content from Word documents via
scripts/office/unpack.pyandpandoccalls.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; extracted content is interpolated into the agent context without explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.\n
- Capability inventory: High-risk subprocess execution (
soffice,gcc,git) and file system operations.\n - Sanitization: Employs
defusedxmlfor secure XML parsing to prevent XXE attacks.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: External library dependency. The skill instructions recommend the global installation of thedocxlibrary from the public npm registry for document generation tasks.
Audit Metadata