docx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Runtime compilation of system components. The script scripts/office/soffice.py embeds C source code which it writes to disk and compiles using gcc into a shared library. This process involves executing compiler commands at runtime.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Process injection via shared library. The shared object compiled by the skill is loaded into the LibreOffice process using the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to intercept and wrap system calls related to network sockets.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Dynamic macro generation and execution. The script scripts/accept_changes.py programmatically creates a LibreOffice macro and installs it into a temporary application profile to automate document editing tasks.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Ingestion of untrusted data surface.\n
  • Ingestion points: Extracted content from Word documents via scripts/office/unpack.py and pandoc calls.\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent; extracted content is interpolated into the agent context without explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.\n
  • Capability inventory: High-risk subprocess execution (soffice, gcc, git) and file system operations.\n
  • Sanitization: Employs defusedxml for secure XML parsing to prevent XXE attacks.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: External library dependency. The skill instructions recommend the global installation of the docx library from the public npm registry for document generation tasks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 30, 2026, 08:59 AM