specialist-product-behavioral-nudge-engine
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through the interpolation of the
{the_user_question}variable. - Ingestion points: User input is ingested via the
{the_user_question}placeholder in theSKILL.mdfile within theAgenttool call. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple quotes) or specific 'ignore instructions within input' warnings to separate the system instructions from the user-provided content.
- Capability inventory: The spawned sub-agent is designed to suggest actions, draft replies, and interact with user preferences. If the user input contains malicious instructions, the sub-agent could be coerced into providing biased or unauthorized advice.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the user input before it is passed to the sub-agent prompt.
Audit Metadata