interrogate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted code diffs and files which are then interpolated into subagent prompts.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted repository content and diffs are collected in
SKILL.md(Step 1) and placed into the{DIFF_OR_FILES}placeholder withinreferences/reviewer-prompt.md. - Boundary markers: While the template uses markdown headers like
## Code Under Review, it lacks robust delimiters or explicit instructions for subagents to disregard instructions embedded within the analyzed code (e.g., in comments or string literals). - Capability inventory: The skill can read local files, execute shell commands via
git diff, and spawn subagents to process the data. - Sanitization: There is no logic to sanitize or escape the code content before it is passed to the LLM reviewers.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes
git diffcommands (e.g.,git diff origin/main...HEAD) to identify the scope of the review. This is an expected and legitimate use of shell tools for a code review skill.
Audit Metadata