flux-opencode-desloppify

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install an external Python package using pip install --upgrade "desloppify[full]". The documentation references https://github.com/peteromallet/desloppify as the source, which is an untrusted personal repository, posing a supply chain risk.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Following installation, the skill immediately executes the downloaded tool via shell commands such as desloppify scan and desloppify update-skill opencode. This pattern allows for the execution of arbitrary remote code on the user's system.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill accepts $ARGUMENTS which include user-defined paths (e.g., --path <dir>). These arguments are directly interpolated into shell commands (desloppify scan --path .), creating a risk of command injection if the input is not properly sanitized by the agent platform.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates indirect prompt injection by scanning external codebases where malicious instructions could be embedded.
  • Ingestion points: The tool reads the entire directory at the specified path (.) via desloppify scan (SKILL.md, Phase 2).
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or delimiters are defined to separate codebase content from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to run shell commands (pip, bash, desloppify) and modify files via the desloppify resolve workflow.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the findings generated from the scanned code before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 31, 2026, 05:20 AM