flux-opencode-desloppify
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install an external Python package using
pip install --upgrade "desloppify[full]". The documentation referenceshttps://github.com/peteromallet/desloppifyas the source, which is an untrusted personal repository, posing a supply chain risk. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Following installation, the skill immediately executes the downloaded tool via shell commands such as
desloppify scananddesloppify update-skill opencode. This pattern allows for the execution of arbitrary remote code on the user's system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill accepts
$ARGUMENTSwhich include user-defined paths (e.g.,--path <dir>). These arguments are directly interpolated into shell commands (desloppify scan --path .), creating a risk of command injection if the input is not properly sanitized by the agent platform. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates indirect prompt injection by scanning external codebases where malicious instructions could be embedded.
- Ingestion points: The tool reads the entire directory at the specified path (
.) viadesloppify scan(SKILL.md, Phase 2). - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or delimiters are defined to separate codebase content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to run shell commands (
pip,bash,desloppify) and modify files via thedesloppify resolveworkflow. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the findings generated from the scanned code before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata