flux-opencode-improve

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow executes shell scripts (e.g., manage-preferences.sh, install-cli.sh) using variables derived directly from user input ($ARGUMENTS). For example, in Step 1, the --dismiss <name> and --alternative <rec> <alt> options pass user-supplied strings into shell command lines. Without rigorous sanitization, this pattern is susceptible to command injection.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads local session history from ~/.opencode/sessions/ and environment data. While the analysis is described as local, using the optional --discover flag results in search queries derived from this context being sent to external APIs (Exa and Twitter).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill clones and updates a remote repository (https://github.com/Nairon-AI/flux-recommendations.git) to fetch recommendation data. It also automates the installation of external tools (MCPs, CLI tools, and plugins) via npx, brew, and other package managers based on the remote recommendations.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process for recommended tools involves executing commands specified in the recommendation files (e.g., install-cli.sh "<name>" "<install_command>"). This provides a mechanism for executing code defined in a remote, author-controlled repository.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Processes untrusted data from local session logs in ~/.opencode/sessions/, which could contain malicious instructions embedded in previous session content.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are documented for the session parsing or matching logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands for tool installation and modify local configuration files like ~/.mcp.json.
  • Sanitization: There is no documentation of sanitization or filtering applied to the content retrieved from session logs before it is used to influence the matching engine.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 31, 2026, 05:20 AM