flux-opencode-ruminate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local binaries and scripts, specifically
$OPENCODE_DIR/bin/fluxctland$OPENCODE_DIR/skill/flux-opencode-meditate/scripts/snapshot.sh. These operations are used to manage session phases and create brain snapshots within the vendor's environment. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive user data by reading conversation history from the
~/.opencode/sessions/directory. While this access is central to the skill's stated purpose, it constitutes data exposure of private conversation logs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data (past conversations) and uses it to drive agent behavior and modify local files.
- Ingestion points: Past conversation files located in
~/.opencode/sessions/(as described in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions or delimiters provided to subagents to distinguish between legitimate conversation history and potential malicious instructions embedded within that history.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
shandfluxctl, write to the.flux/brain/directory, and directly modify theSKILL.mdfiles of other skills. - Sanitization: None. The skill parses raw session files into readable text and batches them for analysis without any validation or escaping of the content.
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