x-search

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands by interpolating user-controlled variables (like the search topic) into a command string: hermes -z "<prompt>". Because the prompt is wrapped in double quotes in a shell environment, any user input containing shell metacharacters such as backticks or $(...) will be evaluated and executed by the host shell before the hermes tool is even invoked.
  • Evidence: The prompt templates in SKILL.md show direct interpolation of user input into the shell command string.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from X (Twitter) posts. It explicitly instructs the agent to transcribe the text verbatim and "mirror the source," providing a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions hidden in posts could hijack the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data fetched from X (Twitter) via the x_search tool (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions demand verbatim transcription ("文字起こし") and do not include protective delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings for the fetched content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool, allowing it to execute local shell commands (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: None. The skill requires full text retrieval without filtering for potential injection patterns.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 17, 2026, 10:58 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — x-search