init-first-agent

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads sensitive configuration files to verify credentials.
  • Evidence: The instructions direct the agent to "Cross-check .env for the relevant credentials" in step 1 of SKILL.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple local scripts and system commands to manage the agent service and database.
  • Evidence:
  • Uses launchctl and systemctl to check service status.
  • Runs scripts/q.ts via pnpm exec tsx to query the data/v2.db SQLite database.
  • Runs setup/index.ts via npx tsx for Telegram pairing.
  • Uses the ncl CLI tool to list groups and wirings.
  • Executes scripts/init-first-agent.ts to perform final wiring and initialization.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user input and interpolates it directly into shell command arguments, creating a vulnerability surface for command injection.
  • Ingestion points: USER_HANDLE, DISPLAY_NAME, and AGENT_NAME are collected as free-form text from the operator in SKILL.md step 2.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in these variables.
  • Capability inventory: The skill triggers a shell execution of scripts/init-first-agent.ts in step 5, passing the user-controlled variables as arguments.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions to sanitize or validate the user input before it is passed to the shell script.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 30, 2026, 02:00 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — init-first-agent