init-onecli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill downloads and executes shell scripts from an external domain (
onecli.sh) by piping the output ofcurldirectly to the shell (sh). This pattern allows for the execution of arbitrary remote code on the host system. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill reads the entire contents of the project's
.envfile usingcatand extracts sensitive credentials, includingANTHROPIC_API_KEY,CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, andOPENAI_API_KEY. It also instructs the agent to capture credentials directly from user chat responses. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill modifies system configuration by appending environment variable exports to shell initialization files (
~/.bashrcand~/.zshrc) to persistently alter the systemPATH. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various system-level commands, including managing Docker Compose stacks, restarting system services via
systemctlandlaunchctl, and modifying local environment files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains logic to process data from external files (
.env) and user-provided input, interpolating these values into shell commands (onecli secrets create) without sanitization or boundary markers. - Ingestion points:
.envfile content (viacat), user chat input. - Boundary markers: Absent; data is processed as raw strings.
- Capability inventory: File system access (read/write), shell execution (
curl,sh,docker,pnpm), and network access. - Sanitization: No evidence of validation or escaping for ingested data before command interpolation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata