migrate-from-v1
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands such as
systemctl,launchctl,git, andpnpmto restart system services, inspect repository history, and verify installation health. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
pnpm exec tsx -eto execute inline TypeScript code fragments for retrieving system service labels and interacting with the database connection logic. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill facilitates the seeding of the 'owner' role globally within the database via the
grantRolefunction, which grants highest-level administrative permissions across the platform. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The migration process involves accessing and merging sensitive data from
.envfiles, WhatsApp authentication keystores (store/auth), and platform-specific user identifiers. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external files such as
handoff.jsonand legacy configuration files (.v1-container-config.json) to drive logic transitions, creating an attack surface where maliciously crafted files could influence the migration path. - Ingestion points:
logs/setup-migration/handoff.json,container.json, andstore/messages.db(file: SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None provided; the agent is instructed to read the raw JSON/SQL content directly into its context.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
systemctl,launchctl,pnpm, andgit; database write access viagrantRoleandUPSERToperations (file: SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to mask credentials during display, but lacks formal validation for the schema of ingested configuration files.
Audit Metadata