migrate-from-v1

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands such as systemctl, launchctl, git, and pnpm to restart system services, inspect repository history, and verify installation health.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses pnpm exec tsx -e to execute inline TypeScript code fragments for retrieving system service labels and interacting with the database connection logic.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill facilitates the seeding of the 'owner' role globally within the database via the grantRole function, which grants highest-level administrative permissions across the platform.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The migration process involves accessing and merging sensitive data from .env files, WhatsApp authentication keystores (store/auth), and platform-specific user identifiers.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external files such as handoff.json and legacy configuration files (.v1-container-config.json) to drive logic transitions, creating an attack surface where maliciously crafted files could influence the migration path.
  • Ingestion points: logs/setup-migration/handoff.json, container.json, and store/messages.db (file: SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None provided; the agent is instructed to read the raw JSON/SQL content directly into its context.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via systemctl, launchctl, pnpm, and git; database write access via grantRole and UPSERT operations (file: SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to mask credentials during display, but lacks formal validation for the schema of ingested configuration files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 30, 2026, 02:00 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — migrate-from-v1