slack-agent-flow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with
https://slack.nanoclaw.devto provision Slack applications and generate agent avatars. This is a vendor-owned service ('nanocoai') central to the skill's functionality. Additionally, the installation process fetches companion files from the repository'schannelsbranch. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands during installation (e.g.,
pnpm run build) and service management. Theslack-agent-flow-finish.tsscript executessetup/lib/restart.shto apply new configuration by restarting the host process. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user or agent-supplied data such as room names and purposes, which are interpolated into Slack canvas contracts and system nudges.
- Ingestion points: Arguments for the
create_agentandcreate_roomtools, specifically thenameandpurposefields. - Boundary markers: The room purpose is wrapped in blockquote markers (
>) within the generated Slack canvas markdown. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write to the
.envfile, modify the central database, and perform network requests to Slack and the provisioning broker. - Sanitization: Input is sanitized via
normalizeNamefor identifiers, and thepublicPurposehelper truncates purpose strings to 80 characters. Most importantly, all agent-initiated room and creation actions are protected by an admin-approval guard that prevents unauthorized execution of these capabilities.
Audit Metadata