release-testing-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and parses content from various external file formats (Excel, Word, CSV, XMind, Markdown) using custom scripts like
scripts/parse_formats.pyandscripts/xlsx_reader.py. This presents an attack surface where an attacker could embed malicious instructions in a test document to manipulate the agent's release recommendations or subsequent skill calls. - Ingestion points:
scripts/parse_formats.py,scripts/convert_formats.py, andscripts/xlsx_reader.py(viaread_workbook). - Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is not instructed to treat parsed content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill generates Go/No-Go decisions and orchestrates other AI agent skills.
- Sanitization: The scripts perform no sanitization of the extracted text before it enters the model's context.- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Several utility scripts in the
scripts/directory (e.g.,convert_to_csv.py,parse_excel.py,batch_convert_templates.py) usesubprocess.callto dynamically invoke other Python scripts within the package. While these calls target local files using computed paths, they facilitate the execution of logic based on command-line arguments.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill package includes numerous Python scripts that execute other local processes usingsubprocess.call. This is used to pipe data through various conversion stages.- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: TheREADME.mddocumentation encourages Windows users to run a PowerShell installation script with the-ExecutionPolicy Bypassflag, which disables the security feature intended to prevent the execution of untrusted scripts.
Audit Metadata