leaving-pr-comments

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process and respond to content within GitHub Pull Requests, which includes untrusted data from external contributors (PR descriptions, code comments, and code changes). This represents a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in a PR could attempt to influence the agent's output or actions.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads the contents of GitHub Pull Requests (SKILL.md) to generate comments.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters (like triple backticks or XML tags) or provide warnings to ignore instructions found within the PR content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write and post comments to GitHub and resolve review threads.
  • Sanitization: The skill includes an instruction to manually check comments for secrets and private details before posting, but lacks technical sanitization or escaping mechanisms for the ingested data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 12, 2026, 04:02 AM