sangkayana
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local files to audit usage, specifically
~/.claude/history.jsonl(containing full conversation history) and~/.claude/projects/*/memory/*.md(containing project-specific user notes). While this access is required for the skill's primary function of tallying usage evidence, it exposes private interaction history to the agent context. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted historical data.
- Ingestion points:
~/.claude/history.jsonl,~/.claude/projects/*/memory/*.md, and session transcripts in~/.claude/projects/*/*.jsonl. - Boundary markers: Absent. The agent is instructed to read these files directly to determine usage and user intent.
- Capability inventory: Execution of a local Node.js script (
tally.mts), execution ofnpx skills remove, and manual deletion of directories. - Sanitization: None. The skill reads and interprets raw historical text to find prose traces of desired functionality.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Node.js utility script provided with the skill and uses the
npx skills removecommand to modify the system's installed skills based on the audit results.
Audit Metadata