git-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the processing of git repository data.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads output from
git diff --cachedandgit logto generate commit messages and changelogs. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit markers or instructions defined to isolate the agent from instructions that might be embedded in code diffs or commit history.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands (
npm,composer,gh), modify project files, and interact with the GitHub API to change repository settings. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the ingested git data is described in the skill instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs administrative repository management using the GitHub CLI.
- It uses
gh apito programmatically configure branch protection rules and update repository settings like squash merge defaults. - It automates the release process by creating tags and GitHub Releases using local metadata.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of standard development dependencies from official registries.
- It installs well-known tools for commit linting and git hooks, such as
@commitlint/cli,husky, andcaptainhook/captainhookvia NPM and Composer. - These downloads target established registries and represent standard industry practices for project configuration.
Audit Metadata