short-form-edit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted transcript and video data, which represents a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Transcript files (
assets/transcript.json), source video files, and reference reels are read by the agent to shape the editorial direction and timing. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" guards for the transcript processing phase.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses local scripts (
node,powershell) for validation, writes project artifacts to the file system, and performs network operations via external APIs. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of transcript content is mentioned before it is used to influence the agent's editorial decisions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external services such as ElevenLabs for transcription and Kie.ai for B-roll generation.
- Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to use these services and refer todocs/TOOLS-AND-API-KEYS.mdfor credentials. - Context: These interactions are central to the skill's primary function and follow the author's specified tool chain.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local Node.js scripts to validate project plans and footage assets.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdincludes commands to runscripts/validate-plan.mjsandscripts/validate-footage.mjsusingnode. - Context: These scripts are internal to the skill and perform safety/quality checks on project metadata and file hashes.
Audit Metadata