claude-zai-teammate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Automates the bypass of interactive safety prompts in the
claude-zaitool. The skill launches the tool with the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag and then usestmux send-keysto programmatically select the 'accept' option (sending '2') in the resulting security confirmation menu, effectively neutralizing the tool's built-in safety checks.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Usestmuxto create windows and send arbitrary keyboard input to terminal panes. This provides a mechanism for the skill to control and execute commands within a sub-agent's shell environment via terminal automation.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8). * Ingestion points: Data from task descriptions and plan files stored in~/.claude/plans/are interpolated into the teammate's initial briefing. * Boundary markers: No delimiters or specific 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are used when passing untrusted data to the sub-agent. * Capability inventory: The skill can launch external CLIs, create tmux windows, and send keystrokes to active terminal sessions. * Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of dynamic variables (such as<taskslug>orTASK) is performed before they are sent viatmux send-keys, which could lead to command or instruction injection.
Audit Metadata