eli5-compress
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a shell command (
python3 -m scripts <absolute_filepath>) where the file path is a variable provided by the user. If the agent does not properly sanitize or quote this variable, it could lead to command injection if a malicious filename is processed. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. It reads untrusted content from user-specified files and interpolates it directly into a prompt template sent to the
claudecommand line tool. - Ingestion points: The content of the target file is read in
scripts/compress.pyusing thefilepath.read_text()method. - Boundary markers: The skill uses XML-style tags (
<TEXT>,<ORIGINAL>, and<COMPRESSED>) to delimit untrusted content. These markers can be easily bypassed if the input file contains the corresponding closing tag (e.g.,</TEXT>). - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read and write files (overwriting original project files like
CLAUDE.md) and execute subprocesses viasubprocess.runto call theclaudeCLI. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping, filtering, or validation of the file content before it is interpolated into the prompt templates in
scripts/compress.py.
Audit Metadata