cs-onboard
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates an indirect prompt injection surface. It collects untrusted user input (interview responses) and stores it in a persistent location (
~/.claude/company-context.md) specifically designed to be read by other C-suite advisor skills. - Ingestion points: Data is collected through user dialogue during the
/cs:setupand/cs:updateworkflows described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The
templates/company-context-template.mddoes not define clear boundaries or data/instruction separators to ensure downstream skills treat the content as untrusted data. - Capability inventory: The agent must use file-writing capabilities to generate the persistent context file.
- Sanitization: Absent. Malicious instructions provided by a user during the interview are written directly to the context file, potentially compromising other skills that ingest this file.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to write to a configuration directory in the user's home folder (
~/.claude/). While this is central to the skill's functionality as a persistent context provider, modifying files in home-directory configuration paths is a sensitive operation that exceeds typical project-level file access.
Audit Metadata