google-workspace-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/gws_recipe_runner.pyusessubprocess.runwithshell=Trueto execute pre-defined Google Workspace commands from an internal recipe dictionary. While the commands are static, the use of a shell-interpolated execution environment is a known security surface that could be exploited if the script's logic is modified to handle external input. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill identifies and facilitates the download of the
gwsCLI from the@anthropic/gwsNPM package and thegoogleworkspace/cliGitHub repository. These sources are associated with the intended functionality and established vendors. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes content from external sources, such as Gmail messages and Drive files, which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested through various service commands in
scripts/workspace_audit.pyandscripts/gws_recipe_runner.py. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on JSON/NDJSON formatting and the
scripts/output_analyzer.pytool to structure data, but does not include explicit instructions for the agent to disregard embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including shell command execution, email transmission, and file system modifications via the
gwsCLI. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or filtering for the data retrieved from Google Workspace APIs.
Audit Metadata