google-workspace-cli

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/gws_recipe_runner.py uses subprocess.run with shell=True to execute pre-defined Google Workspace commands from an internal recipe dictionary. While the commands are static, the use of a shell-interpolated execution environment is a known security surface that could be exploited if the script's logic is modified to handle external input.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill identifies and facilitates the download of the gws CLI from the @anthropic/gws NPM package and the googleworkspace/cli GitHub repository. These sources are associated with the intended functionality and established vendors.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes content from external sources, such as Gmail messages and Drive files, which could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: External data is ingested through various service commands in scripts/workspace_audit.py and scripts/gws_recipe_runner.py.
  • Boundary markers: The skill relies on JSON/NDJSON formatting and the scripts/output_analyzer.py tool to structure data, but does not include explicit instructions for the agent to disregard embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including shell command execution, email transmission, and file system modifications via the gws CLI.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or filtering for the data retrieved from Google Workspace APIs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 12, 2026, 08:16 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — google-workspace-cli