prompt-engineer-toolkit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/prompt_tester.pyallows the execution of arbitrary external commands via the--runner-cmdargument. Although it usesshlex.split()and avoidsshell=Trueto mitigate basic shell meta-character injection, the core functionality enables the agent to run any command provided in the template. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes prompts and test cases from external files without sanitization or boundary markers. A malicious file in a project could trick the agent into using a dangerous
--runner-cmdtemplate. Ingestion points: Reads from user-provided files inscripts/prompt_tester.pyandscripts/prompt_versioner.py. Boundary markers: Absent; no delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted file content. Capability inventory: Executes subprocesses inscripts/prompt_tester.pyand writes to a local JSONL file inscripts/prompt_versioner.py. Sanitization: Usesshlex.splitto parse arguments, which mitigates shell injection but does not validate the command's safety or purpose.
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