atlassian-mcp
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install and run third-party, community-maintained MCP servers such as
@sooperset/mcp-atlassianandatlassian-mcp. These packages originate from unverified sources outside of recognized trusted vendors.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Configuration examples provided for Claude Desktop involve the use ofnpxanduvxto download and execute remote code during the initialization of the MCP environment.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection through its automation workflows.\n - Ingestion points: The triage and documentation sync workflows in
references/common-workflows.mdread untrusted content from Jira issue fields (summary, description) and Confluence page content.\n - Boundary markers: The implementation lacks delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the processed external data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant write capabilities across the Atlassian suite, including creating and updating issues and pages, which could be abused if malicious instructions are processed.\n
- Sanitization: There is no sanitization of input data for logic control; sanitization is only applied to output formatting (e.g.,
escapeHtml).
Audit Metadata