critique
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data such as source code, commit history, and user requirements, which establishes a potential surface for instructions embedded in that data to influence the judge agents' output.
- Ingestion points: Files, conversation history, and requirement summaries are ingested in Phase 1 and interpolated into sub-agent prompts via placeholders like
{requirements}and{code snippets}. - Boundary markers: The sub-agent prompts use structured
[CONTEXT]tags and distinct section headers to separate instructions from the ingested content. - Capability inventory: The skill coordinates sub-agents using the
Tasktool for analysis. It does not perform file writes, network requests, or direct command execution. - Sanitization: There is no explicit escaping or sanitization of the processed content before it is provided to the sub-agents.
Audit Metadata