logging-best-practices
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill recommends logging sensitive business context and PII, including
user.email,user.id, andlifetime_value_cents(as seen inrules/context.mdandrules/wide-events.md). Users adopting these patterns should ensure their logging backend and storage are appropriately secured and compliant with privacy regulations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides patterns that ingest untrusted data from request bodies and headers (e.g.,
c.req.json(),user-agent,x-request-id) and incorporates them directly into logs. This creates a potential surface for indirect injection if these logs are later processed by automated agents or LLMs without sanitization. - Ingestion points:
c.req.json(),c.req.header('user-agent')inrules/structure.mdandrules/wide-events.md. - Boundary markers: None specified in the logging middleware examples.
- Capability inventory: External output via
logger.infoinrules/structure.md. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of external content is implemented in the provided examples.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The
authorfield in theSKILL.mdfrontmatter is set toboristane, which is inconsistent with the provided vendor contextneondatabase. This likely indicates the skill is based on the work of the referenced observability author but reflects a metadata mismatch.
Audit Metadata