ml-pipeline

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements several patterns for loading and saving models using libraries that are vulnerable to arbitrary code execution through unsafe deserialization. Specifically, the 'FeaturePipeline.load' method in 'references/feature-engineering.md' uses 'pickle.load()', and multiple components in 'references/pipeline-orchestration.md' use 'joblib.load()', both of which can execute arbitrary code when processing a malicious file. Additionally, 'references/training-pipelines.md' utilizes 'torch.load()' for checkpoints, which is also based on pickle and carries similar risks.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill designs pipelines that ingest untrusted data from external sources (e.g., Parquet files, S3/GCS buckets) for feature engineering and training, creating an indirect prompt injection surface. While the skill includes data quality checks via Great Expectations, it lacks security-focused sanitization to prevent adversarial data from influencing model behavior or exploiting vulnerabilities in data-processing libraries.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a shell script 'launch_distributed.sh' that executes 'torchrun' with configurable arguments. While intended for distributed training, this pattern allows for shell command execution within the agent's environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 15, 2026, 04:40 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ml-pipeline