exstraktor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted chat history to update long-term storage, potentially allowing embedded malicious instructions to influence future agent behavior. \n
- Ingestion points: Chat session content is retrieved via
session_search(SKILL.md). \n - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiting or instructions to ignore commands within the session data. \n
- Capability inventory: The agent can write to local SQLite databases (
memorytool), update markdown files (MODEL_CARD.md), execute session deletion commands, and send data to Qdrant. \n - Sanitization:
extractor_gate.pyperforms quality checks on text length and keyword substance but does not filter for prompt injection. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to offer the execution of thehermes sessions deletecommand to remove chat logs (SKILL.md). \n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Extracted session data is sent to a Qdrant database. While defaulting to localhost, theQDRANT_URLenvironment variable allows directing this data to arbitrary remote endpoints (upsert.py). \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Theupsert.pyscript utilizessentence-transformerswhich downloads pre-trained embedding models from public repositories upon initialization.
Audit Metadata