ugc-hooks
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes a significant amount of untrusted external data, including TikTok video captions, transcripts, and OCR-extracted text from video frames. This content is passed to an LLM for classification and sorting (Step 4), which presents a risk where malicious instructions embedded in the external content could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Video metadata fetched via Apify, OCR results from
decompose_video.py, and Whisper-generated transcripts. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify delimitation or sanitization steps to isolate external text from internal instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-writing capabilities, video rendering via
render_video.py, and automated social media posting viaschedule_post.py(Step 9). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several local Python scripts (e.g.,
carousel_scan.py,decompose_video.py,engagement.py) to automate its workflows. These scripts execute shell commands and interact with the local filesystem and external APIs. While these operations are intrinsic to the skill's function, they represent a significant local execution surface. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While not malicious, the skill includes a specific 'Privacy Gate' procedure (Step 7 and Step 5 of the reference) aimed at identifying and removing sensitive information—such as contacts, camera roll photos, and notifications—from user-provided screen recordings before video rendering, which is a notable security best practice.
Audit Metadata