skills/netaart/okp/okp-import/Gen Agent Trust Hub

okp-import

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions specify the installation of the @markbangwu/okp package from the npm registry as a prerequisite for operation.
  • Evidence: npm install -g @markbangwu/okp in SKILL.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow relies heavily on the execution of the okp CLI tool to manage domains, handle invitations, and perform data import operations.
  • Evidence: Multiple bash command examples including okp domain <domain> --set readme.md, okp invite accept, okp put, and okp batch in SKILL.md.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data (domain README files and concept content) to "distill" structured JSON. This ingestion of untrusted content represents a vulnerability surface where embedded instructions could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: okp domain <domain> (retrieves remote README content) and Step 3 (distillation of external raw data) in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None specified in the distillation instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Network communication with the OKP API and command execution via the CLI tool.
  • Sanitization: While Step 4 mentions schema validation for fields, there is no evidence of prompt-level sanitization for ingested text content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 02:41 PM