netbox-config-templates
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents the processing of external data sources for interpolation into Jinja2 templates, which represents a potential injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from the NetBox database (ORM objects), hierarchical Config Contexts, and user-supplied POST body data via the
/render-config/and/render/API endpoints, as described inSKILL.mdandreferences/context-variables.md. - Boundary markers: The system utilizes standard Jinja2 delimiters (e.g.,
{{ ... }}and{% ... %}) to separate template logic from data. - Capability inventory: Rendered templates can perform read-only ORM queries against the NetBox database and access whitelisted system environment variables via the
envfilter. The skill notes that templates are restricted from file system access or arbitrary Python imports. - Sanitization: NetBox utilizes
jinja2.sandbox.SandboxedEnvironmentfor rendering. The documentation highlights security controls such as theenvironment_paramsallowlist and theJINJA_ENVIRONMENT_PARAMSconfiguration for environment variable access. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions on defining and executing Jinja2 templates, which is a form of dynamic execution for configuration generation.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/api-rendering-patterns.mddetail the API methods for rendering templates and include examples of embedded logic and ORM queries. - Context: The documentation includes explicit warnings regarding performance impacts of unbounded queries and references security patches (such as CVE-2026-29514) related to template environment parameters.
Audit Metadata