netdata-config-from-requirements
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted requirements documents and prose to generate functional configurations and scripts. It lacks explicit delimiters to isolate customer-provided data from system instructions.\n
- Ingestion points: Customer requirements documents, pasted prose, architecture briefs, or attached files (
SKILL.md,rules/extract-requirements.md).\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters (such as XML tags or special markers) to isolate the requirements document text within the prompt context.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent can write YAML configurations and shell scripts (
netdata/claim.sh) as part of the deliverable bundle (rules/deliverable-bundle.md).\n - Sanitization: No specific input sanitization is mentioned, though the skill mandates manual verification of the bundle by an account team and the customer before production use.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates executable shell scripts (
claim.sh) and instructions to run a Python subprocess command for YAML linting. While the linting command uses the secureyaml.safe_load()function, generating executable content from user-provided requirements constitutes a dynamic execution pattern.\n - Evidence:
SKILL.md(Verification section) describes running apython -clinting command, andrules/deliverable-bundle.mdspecifies the creation of anetdata/claim.shscript artifact.
Audit Metadata