ai-full-figure
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The scripts
scripts/build_figure.py,scripts/overlay_labels.py, andexamples/poster_substrate.pyutilize theimportlib.utilmodule to dynamically load and execute Python code from computed relative paths. Specifically, the_load_moduleand_load_validate_fontsfunctions are used to load components likecompose.py,export.py, andvalidate_fonts.pyfrom a sibling skill directory (scientific-figure). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
examples/poster_substrate.pyscript usessubprocess.runto execute other Python scripts within the skill's directory structure (such asgenerate_figure.pyandoverlay_labels.py) using the system's Python executable. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting data from external files and user arguments which are interpolated into model prompts.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/build_figure.pyandscripts/generate_figure.pyread configuration and subject data from--spec,--theme, and positional command-line arguments. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the model to ignore potentially malicious content embedded within the user-supplied strings during prompt construction.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment includes capabilities for file system writes, shell command execution via subprocesses, and dynamic Python module execution.
- Sanitization: The skill performs basic validation for specific fields (like hex colors and image sizes) but lacks general sanitization for the natural language content used in prompt construction.
Audit Metadata