epic-dev
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
gh-sub-issueextension from theagbiotechGitHub repository if it is not already present. This introduces external code from a source that is not part of a verified trusted provider. - Evidence:
gh extension install agbiotech/gh-sub-issueinSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of shell commands for repository operations, including
gitworktree management andghCLI interactions for issue and pull request handling. It also executes project-specific commands likeproject-detect-repo-configand integration tests. - Evidence: Use of
git -C,gh issue create,gh sub-issue add, andgh pr createinSKILL.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the repository environment and user descriptions to drive its logic, which presents a surface for potential instruction injection.
- Ingestion points: The output of
project-detect-repo-config, local state from.claude/epic.local.md, and user-provided epic descriptions. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or boundary markers for external data ingestion.
- Capability inventory: Git and GitHub CLI operations, file writing to the
.claude/directory, and execution of arbitrary project tests. - Sanitization: No explicit validation or sanitization of ingested content is documented before its use in orchestrating the workflow.
Audit Metadata