svg-figure
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/editor_prep.pyscript executes thefc-matchutility viasubprocess.runto resolve font family names to filesystem paths. This is a legitimate use of a system utility and is implemented safely by passing a list of arguments, which prevents shell injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions specify installing standard, reputable Python packages through
uv run, includingdrawsvg,svgpathtools,fonttools,cairosvg,lxml, andshapely. These are well-established libraries for vector graphics and geometry processing. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes SVG files which may originate from external collaborators, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection. However, the processing is limited to structural XML transformations and does not involve executing script content or interpolating untrusted text into system-level prompts.
- Ingestion points: SVG files processed by
etree.parseinscripts/editor_prep.py. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined for untrusted inputs.
- Capability inventory: File system write operations and execution of the local
fc-matchutility. - Sanitization: Uses the
lxmllibrary for secure XML parsing and includes validation logic for font sizes and attribute units.
Audit Metadata