transparent-icons
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing external commands via
subprocess.runto perform its core functions. - In
scripts/generate_icon.py, thegenerate_icon_codexfunction invokes thecodexCLI with a natural language instruction constructed from user input. - In
examples/icon_set.py, the script executes thegenerate_icon.pytool as a subprocess to create a batch of icons. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in data processed by the agent.
- Ingestion points: User-provided strings for icon descriptions (
prompt) and batch items (batch) are accepted as command-line arguments inscripts/generate_icon.py. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or specific instructions to the underlying model to ignore embedded commands within the user-provided prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands through the
codexCLI and write PNG files to the local file system. - Sanitization: Absent. The script directly interpolates user input into the command string. A developer comment in
scripts/generate_icon.pyexplicitly notes that the prompt is not sanitized because it is assumed to come from a trusted shell session. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads external assets during runtime.
- Selecting the
birefnettransparency method causes therembglibrary to download a ~400 MB ONNX model file from a remote source to the local~/.u2netdirectory. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill probes the local environment for authentication data.
- It checks for the existence of a Codex authentication file at
~/.codex/auth.jsonand loads secrets from local and home-directory.envfiles to authenticate with the OpenAI API.
Audit Metadata