project-brain
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a vulnerability surface by requiring the agent to fetch and prioritize instructions from an external repository defined in a local
.project-brain.jsonfile. - Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read
agent-guide.md, wiki pages, and source files from a remote GitHub repository into its context before performing substantive work. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters or provide warnings to the agent to treat the ingested external content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides access to the GitHub CLI (
gh) for repository cloning, API interaction, and creating pull requests, which could be abused if the agent follows malicious instructions from the "brain" repository. - Sanitization: Absent. Content from the external repository is processed directly to ground the agent's reasoning without validation or filtering.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands via the GitHub CLI (
gh) to check authentication status, clone repositories, and interact with the GitHub API. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches raw content and clones repositories from GitHub based on the
repositoryfield found in the.project-brain.jsonconfiguration file.
Audit Metadata