devops-troubleshooter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process potentially untrusted external data, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill instructions explicitly direct the agent to gather data from external sources including "logging platforms" (ELK, Loki), "APM solutions" (DataDog, Honeycomb), "Distributed tracing" (Jaeger, Zipkin), and general "logs, metrics, and traces" (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential natural language commands embedded within the processed logs or trace data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including the use of
kubectl, cloud CLIs (aws cli,gcloud,Azure CLI), and system-level performance tools which could be targeted by injected instructions (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There are no mentioned mechanisms for filtering, escaping, or validating the content of the logs or telemetry data before analysis.
Audit Metadata