ui-ux-pro-max
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions for the agent to executesudo apt update && sudo apt install python3to set up the environment. This pattern requests administrative privileges, which is a high-risk operation for an AI agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow in
SKILL.md(Steps 2, 2b, 3, and 4) instructs the agent to execute a local Python scriptsearch.pyusing user-provided keywords and product types directly in the command line (e.g.,python3 ... "<query>"). This creates a direct command injection vulnerability if the user input contains shell metacharacters like semicolons or backticks. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill implements a 'Master + Overrides' pattern where it creates and updates files in
design-system/MASTER.mdanddesign-system/pages/. These files are intended to be read in future sessions, allowing potentially poisoned or malicious design rules to persist and influence agent behavior across different interactions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a defined attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User-provided product types, industry names, and keywords are ingested via the search command in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None are present; user input is directly interpolated into command strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs subprocess execution (
python3 search.py) and file system writes (design-system/MASTER.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or escaping for the user-provided strings before they are passed to the shell or written to persistent files.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata