xlsx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py implements a sophisticated runtime code generation and process injection mechanism.
  • It contains a hardcoded C source code string (_SHIM_SOURCE) designed to shim system socket calls (socket, listen, accept).
  • It writes this code to a temporary file and executes gcc to compile it into a shared object library (lo_socket_shim.so).
  • It then executes the soffice (LibreOffice) binary with the LD_PRELOAD environment variable set to point to this compiled library, effectively injecting custom code into the process to bypass sandbox-imposed network socket restrictions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple components of the skill execute shell commands to interact with the host system.
  • scripts/recalc.py and scripts/office/soffice.py execute soffice and utility commands like timeout or gtimeout to manage document processing.
  • scripts/office/validators/redlining.py executes git diff to perform comparison tasks during validation.
  • scripts/recalc.py modifies the user's application environment by writing a StarBasic macro (RecalculateAndSave) to the LibreOffice configuration directories (~/.config/libreoffice or ~/Library/Application Support/LibreOffice).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a notable attack surface for indirect prompt injection based on its intended use and capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: The skill is designed to read and process untrusted Excel and Word files using openpyxl and lxml (scripts/recalc.py, scripts/office/unpack.py).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to treat embedded file content as data rather than instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-risk capabilities including arbitrary command execution, runtime compilation, and process injection (scripts/office/soffice.py).
  • Sanitization: There is no evident sanitization of content extracted from processed documents before it influences the agent's logic or environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 03:05 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — xlsx