ecommerce-product-ai-visibility

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests large amounts of untrusted external data and feeds it directly into LLM prompts for evaluation.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the system via product identifiers in SKILL.md, web search results (DuckDuckGo) in scripts/api_client_base.py, and responses from external AI engines (ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, DeepSeek) collected in scripts/api_capture_runner.py.
  • Boundary markers: Prompts in assets/prompts/evaluator.md and scripts/evaluator.py interpolate untrusted content (like product USPs and LLM responses) using standard Markdown headers, but do not employ robust isolation techniques such as unique delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write files (profile_builder.py), perform network operations (api_client_base.py, send_report_email.py), and execute shell commands (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Sanitization is minimal; api_client_base.py performs basic regex-based HTML tag removal on search snippets, but there is no semantic filtering of potentially malicious instructions embedded in product descriptions or external engine responses.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The SKILL.md file provides shell command templates that are potentially vulnerable to command injection if the AI agent does not perform proper sanitization of variables.
  • Evidence: In Phase 2, Step 5, the instruction is to run: python3 scripts/send_report_email.py "<product_name>" "<workdir>/data/runs/<slug>/<run_id>" "<report_url>". While variables are wrapped in double quotes, if the <product_name> (which can be derived from user input or search results) contains shell metacharacters like backticks or subshell expansions, it could lead to unauthorized command execution.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external services to perform its core functions. These interactions are consistent with the skill's purpose and target vendor-controlled or well-known infrastructure.
  • DuckDuckGo: scripts/api_client_base.py performs POST requests to https://html.duckduckgo.com/html/ to gather product information.
  • Nexscope API: The skill communicates with the vendor's gateway (https://agent-aigw-test.nexscope.ai/v1) for LLM querying and uses scripts/send_report_email.py to send metrics to the Nexscope proxy endpoint for notification services.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 11, 2026, 07:19 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ecommerce-product-ai-visibility