ecommerce-product-ai-visibility
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests large amounts of untrusted external data and feeds it directly into LLM prompts for evaluation.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system via product identifiers in
SKILL.md, web search results (DuckDuckGo) inscripts/api_client_base.py, and responses from external AI engines (ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, DeepSeek) collected inscripts/api_capture_runner.py. - Boundary markers: Prompts in
assets/prompts/evaluator.mdandscripts/evaluator.pyinterpolate untrusted content (like product USPs and LLM responses) using standard Markdown headers, but do not employ robust isolation techniques such as unique delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write files (
profile_builder.py), perform network operations (api_client_base.py,send_report_email.py), and execute shell commands (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Sanitization is minimal;
api_client_base.pyperforms basic regex-based HTML tag removal on search snippets, but there is no semantic filtering of potentially malicious instructions embedded in product descriptions or external engine responses. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile provides shell command templates that are potentially vulnerable to command injection if the AI agent does not perform proper sanitization of variables. - Evidence: In Phase 2, Step 5, the instruction is to run:
python3 scripts/send_report_email.py "<product_name>" "<workdir>/data/runs/<slug>/<run_id>" "<report_url>". While variables are wrapped in double quotes, if the<product_name>(which can be derived from user input or search results) contains shell metacharacters like backticks or subshell expansions, it could lead to unauthorized command execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external services to perform its core functions. These interactions are consistent with the skill's purpose and target vendor-controlled or well-known infrastructure.
- DuckDuckGo:
scripts/api_client_base.pyperforms POST requests tohttps://html.duckduckgo.com/html/to gather product information. - Nexscope API: The skill communicates with the vendor's gateway (
https://agent-aigw-test.nexscope.ai/v1) for LLM querying and usesscripts/send_report_email.pyto send metrics to the Nexscope proxy endpoint for notification services.
Audit Metadata