ecommerce-temu-store-source-query
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes store data from an external platform (Temu), creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if that data contains malicious instructions. \n
- Ingestion points: The script
scripts/temu_store_source_query.pyretrieves store details including names and categories from a remote gateway. \n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to disregard potential commands embedded within the fetched store data. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network communication (
urllib.request) and local file system writes (open().write()to thenexscope/directory). \n - Sanitization: The script saves the raw JSON response and prints contents without performing sanitization on text fields that could contain adversarial content. \n
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill script performs network requests to an external API gateway. \n
- Evidence:
scripts/temu_store_source_query.pyusesurllib.request.urlopento send POST requests to a URL defined by theNEXSCOPE_PROXY_BASEenvironment variable. \n - Context: This network activity is documented as functional for the purpose of retrieving third-party data from the vendor's infrastructure.
Audit Metadata