claude-md-progressive-disclosurer

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 6, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The post-optimization testing script in SKILL.md contains a command injection vulnerability. It uses eval test -f "$f" to verify files where $f is extracted directly from the user's CLAUDE.md file using grep. An attacker can include shell metacharacters like $(...) in the file path within CLAUDE.md to execute arbitrary commands on the system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes a fraudulent file named .security-scan-passed which claims the skill has passed security audits by tools like gitleaks. This is a metadata poisoning technique designed to deceive users and automated safety scanners about the skill's actual security posture.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from CLAUDE.md files while having access to sensitive capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads the user's main CLAUDE.md file and project-specific CLAUDE.md files.
  • Boundary markers: None. The skill provides no instructions to separate data from instructions within the processed files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read and write files in the ~/.claude/ directory and execute shell commands via the agent's environment.
  • Sanitization: None. The skill moves content directly from the source file to reference files without any validation, escaping, or structural analysis.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 6, 2026, 09:52 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — claude-md-progressive-disclosurer