claude-md-progressive-disclosurer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The post-optimization testing script in
SKILL.mdcontains a command injection vulnerability. It useseval test -f "$f"to verify files where$fis extracted directly from the user'sCLAUDE.mdfile usinggrep. An attacker can include shell metacharacters like$(...)in the file path withinCLAUDE.mdto execute arbitrary commands on the system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes a fraudulent file named
.security-scan-passedwhich claims the skill has passed security audits by tools like gitleaks. This is a metadata poisoning technique designed to deceive users and automated safety scanners about the skill's actual security posture. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from
CLAUDE.mdfiles while having access to sensitive capabilities. - Ingestion points: The agent reads the user's main
CLAUDE.mdfile and project-specificCLAUDE.mdfiles. - Boundary markers: None. The skill provides no instructions to separate data from instructions within the processed files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read and write files in the
~/.claude/directory and execute shell commands via the agent's environment. - Sanitization: None. The skill moves content directly from the source file to reference files without any validation, escaping, or structural analysis.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata