github-ops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions to bypass organizational policy enforcement checks.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.mdandreferences/pr_operations.md, the skill instructs the agent to use the "NOJIRA" prefix in pull request titles specifically to bypass JIRA enforcement checks. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides functional patterns for exposing sensitive authentication credentials to the execution context.
- Evidence: In
references/api_reference.md, the commandgh auth status --show-tokenis provided to reveal the current GitHub authentication token, which could be harvested if the agent context is compromised. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill consists primarily of shell command patterns for the GitHub CLI, including management of repository secrets and workflows.
- Evidence:
references/workflow_operations.mdcontains commands for managing repository secrets (gh secret set) and variables, as well as triggering manual workflow dispatches. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks by processing untrusted data from GitHub repositories.
- Ingestion points: PR titles, issue descriptions, and workflow outputs retrieved via
gh pr list,gh issue list, andgh run listinreferences/best_practices.mdandreferences/issue_operations.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The provided automation scripts do not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: High-privilege actions are enabled, including merging PRs (
gh pr merge), managing repository secrets (gh secret set), and triggering code execution via workflows (gh workflow run). - Sanitization: Absent. The scripting examples (e.g., using
xargsandwhile readloops) do not include sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from repository metadata before using it in subsequent commands.
Audit Metadata