pr-autoloop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses the GitHub CLI (
gh) and the GitHub API to automate PR workflows. - Evidence includes commands like
gh pr view,gh pr checks, andgh apifor reactions and comments. - It includes logic to execute a squash merge once predefined safety conditions are met.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and acts upon untrusted data from an external source (GitHub PR comments).
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches PR comments via
gh api --paginate "repos/$REPO/pulls/$PR_NUM/comments"in theSKILL.mdfile. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions provided to the agent to disregard potentially malicious instructions embedded within the fetched comments.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses high-impact capabilities, including the ability to modify the local worktree for "repairs", push code to the remote repository, and perform a
gh pr mergeoperation. - Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization or validation logic to filter the content of the comments, relying only on the presence of specific "badges" (P1/P2) which could be spoofed by a malicious actor.
Audit Metadata