pr-autoloop

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses the GitHub CLI (gh) and the GitHub API to automate PR workflows.
  • Evidence includes commands like gh pr view, gh pr checks, and gh api for reactions and comments.
  • It includes logic to execute a squash merge once predefined safety conditions are met.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and acts upon untrusted data from an external source (GitHub PR comments).
  • Ingestion points: The skill fetches PR comments via gh api --paginate "repos/$REPO/pulls/$PR_NUM/comments" in the SKILL.md file.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions provided to the agent to disregard potentially malicious instructions embedded within the fetched comments.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses high-impact capabilities, including the ability to modify the local worktree for "repairs", push code to the remote repository, and perform a gh pr merge operation.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization or validation logic to filter the content of the comments, relying only on the presence of specific "badges" (P1/P2) which could be spoofed by a malicious actor.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 08:31 AM