pr-autoloop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and acting upon untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches GitHub PR comments (
repos/$REPO/pulls/$PR_NUM/comments) and issue reactions (repos/$REPO/issues/$PR_NUM/reactions) usinggh api --paginateinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or system instructions are defined to separate the fetched comment content from the agent's instructions, nor are there warnings to ignore commands embedded within those comments.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including modifying local source code (repair phase), pushing changes to the repository, and merging pull requests.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not include any steps to sanitize or validate the content of the comments before they are used to determine the agent's repair and merge logic.
Audit Metadata