design

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts user input via the --prompt flag in several scripts (logo/generate.py, cip/generate.py, icon/generate.py). This input is interpolated directly into prompt templates sent to Gemini AI models. While this presents an attack surface where a user could attempt to influence the AI's generation process, the impact is limited to the generated image or SVG output.
  • [INGESTION POINTS]: User-provided prompts via CLI arguments.
  • [BOUNDARY MARKERS]: None detected in the script prompt templates.
  • [CAPABILITY INVENTORY]: File system writes (saving images/SVGs), network access (Google GenAI API).
  • [SANITIZATION]: Input strings are not sanitized before interpolation.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates HTML files for presentations (scripts/cip/render-html.py) and social media photos (references/social-photos-design.md). These files are then intended to be rendered by a browser or captured as screenshots. This is a core functional requirement of the design workflow.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The Python scripts include a load_env function that reads .env files from the user's home directory (~/.claude/.env and ~/.claude/skills/.env) to retrieve the GEMINI_API_KEY. This is standard practice for secure credential management in this environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 1, 2026, 02:06 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — design