design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts user input via the
--promptflag in several scripts (logo/generate.py,cip/generate.py,icon/generate.py). This input is interpolated directly into prompt templates sent to Gemini AI models. While this presents an attack surface where a user could attempt to influence the AI's generation process, the impact is limited to the generated image or SVG output. - [INGESTION POINTS]: User-provided prompts via CLI arguments.
- [BOUNDARY MARKERS]: None detected in the script prompt templates.
- [CAPABILITY INVENTORY]: File system writes (saving images/SVGs), network access (Google GenAI API).
- [SANITIZATION]: Input strings are not sanitized before interpolation.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates HTML files for presentations (
scripts/cip/render-html.py) and social media photos (references/social-photos-design.md). These files are then intended to be rendered by a browser or captured as screenshots. This is a core functional requirement of the design workflow. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The Python scripts include a
load_envfunction that reads.envfiles from the user's home directory (~/.claude/.envand~/.claude/skills/.env) to retrieve theGEMINI_API_KEY. This is standard practice for secure credential management in this environment.
Audit Metadata