mcp-gitlab-usage

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from GitLab (e.g., merge requests, issue comments, and labels) which could contain malicious instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Tools such as read_merge_request, list_project_labels, and list_milestones (documented in references/tool-catalog.md) ingest content from external GitLab repositories.
  • Boundary markers: The skill implements mandatory confirmation gates (requirements_confirmed, projects_confirmed, issues_creation_confirmed) described in SKILL.md that require explicit human approval before the agent takes significant actions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to tools capable of modifying the environment, including create_issue, set_issue_labels, add_issue_comment, and delete_issue (documented in references/tool-catalog.md).
  • Sanitization: The instructions mandate the use of generate_issue_payload for non-RF execution tasks rather than allowing the agent to hand-craft payloads, providing a layer of structured data validation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to execute specific shell commands to extract environment metadata for project discovery.
  • Evidence: The instructions in SKILL.md require running git remote get-url origin to identify the project path before sending it to the MCP server.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 28, 2026, 06:27 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — mcp-gitlab-usage