nextstage-sdd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to recommend a shell command to the user for installing complementary skills. Evidence:
npx @nextstage-brasil/harness --preset complements --yesfound inSKILL.mdandreferences/skill-integrations.md. This command targets a package provided by the vendor ('nextstage-brasil'). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the installation of an external package from the vendor's registry. Evidence:
@nextstage-brasil/harnessinSKILL.md. This is a legitimate vendor resource associated with the skill's author. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from various local project files which could potentially contain untrusted instructions. This represents an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Files in
docs/versions/(e.g.,requirements.md,tasks/*.md) anddocs/context/(e.g.,design-brief.md,architecture-rules.md). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or markers to isolate external content are defined in the instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can delegate execution to other worker skills and suggest the execution of shell commands.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the ingested content is mentioned.
- [NO_CODE]: The skill package contains documentation, configuration, and evaluation files, but does not include any executable scripts or binaries within its own folder structure.
Audit Metadata