nextstage-sdd

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to recommend a shell command to the user for installing complementary skills. Evidence: npx @nextstage-brasil/harness --preset complements --yes found in SKILL.md and references/skill-integrations.md. This command targets a package provided by the vendor ('nextstage-brasil').
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the installation of an external package from the vendor's registry. Evidence: @nextstage-brasil/harness in SKILL.md. This is a legitimate vendor resource associated with the skill's author.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from various local project files which could potentially contain untrusted instructions. This represents an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
  • Ingestion points: Files in docs/versions/ (e.g., requirements.md, tasks/*.md) and docs/context/ (e.g., design-brief.md, architecture-rules.md).
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or markers to isolate external content are defined in the instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can delegate execution to other worker skills and suggest the execution of shell commands.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the ingested content is mentioned.
  • [NO_CODE]: The skill package contains documentation, configuration, and evaluation files, but does not include any executable scripts or binaries within its own folder structure.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 24, 2026, 08:18 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — nextstage-sdd